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Abstract 
Abstract. In the Global North, confusion, hype and disagreement plague 
nanotechnology debates. In the meantime, the debate about the Global South’s 
engagement with nanotechnology has forged ahead, assuming common 
understandings about what nanotechnology is and what it is not, as well as the 
general irrelevance of definitional debates. This despite evidence that 
nanotechnology is being presented in a conflicting manner in the literature, 
through mixed terminology and imagery, and that little has been documented 
about Southern understandings. Given the importance of understandings in the 
genetically-modified foods debate, the way nanotechnology is understood holds 
serious repercussions for the framing of its ethical, legal and social implications. 
This chapter reports on the perspectives of Thai and Australian key informants, 
from a broad range of fields. It seeks to explore and clarify how nanotechnology 
might be defined, perceived and framed in terms of the South. The results suggest 
that nanotechnology may be conceptualized in similar ways, focussing on near-
term nanotechnology that is defined by a common set of characteristics. Yet, when 
it comes to the way these conceptualisations translate into applications, there may 
be large differences in nanotechnology’s perceived scope, sophistication and 
complexity. This holds interesting ramifications for global nanotechnology 
discourse, particularly in terms of the assumed costs and infrastructure required to 
conduct nanotechnology research and development and the more general role the 
South will play in the global nanotechnology picture. 
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Introduction 
Nanotechnology’s potential implications for the Global South are hotly contested in a 
polarised debate between those who see nanotechnology as part of the ‘development 
solution’ [1-4] and others who see it as part of the ‘development problem’ [5-8]. 
Concurrently, a surprisingly high number of Southern countries are actively engaging 
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in nanotechnology Research and Development (R&D), although Southern input in 
international debates about the technology’s trajectory remains limited [9]. 
In biotechnology’s wake, debates, at both the national and international level are 
often targeted towards nanotechnology’s ethical, legal and social implications (ELSI). 
Amongst biotechnology’s many lessons for nanotechnology is that, in order for open, 
productive dialogue to occur, hype must be distinguished from reality and clarity must 
result in some form of common platform for debate. Without this, we risk a modern 
day rift, such as that surrounding the use of genetically-modified (GM) crops in the 
South, where parties on both sides of the argument accuse each other of misleading the 
public on fundamental matters of understanding [see, for example, 10, 11-13]. For 
nanotechnology, different understandings can be highly influential in shaping the ways 
in which it is assessed [14]. Internationally, the development of relevant regulations 
relies on some kind of common understanding [15]. Domestically, common definitions 
are needed to ensure the proper assessment of nanotechnology’s scientific, legal, 
environmental, regulatory and ethical implications [14, 16], with the risk of applying 
inappropriate understandings potentially disastrous for an area such as regulation [17].  
Given the early concentration of nanotechnology R&D in the North [9], it is useful 
to briefly explore the precedence set by Northern discussions, in terms of how 
nanotechnology is understood. For some, the United States National Nanotechnology 
Initiative’s (NNI) definition of nanotechnology is believed to be most common [18, 
19]. The NNI’s latestii definition states: 
Nanoscience involves research to discover new behaviors and properties of 
materials with dimensions at the nanoscale which ranges roughly from 1 to 
100 nanometers (nm). Nanotechnology is the way discoveries made at the 
nanoscale are put to work. Nanotechnology is more than throwing together a 
batch of nanoscale materials—it requires the ability to manipulate and control 
those materials in a useful way [20]. 
However, as highlighted by research in 2006, nanotechnology is defined in a 
myriad of ways by those engaged in Northern nanotechnology debates; a veneer for 
residual confusion, hype and disagreement about how nanotechnology is understood 
[21]. At the foundation of nanotechnology confusion is the fundamental clash of 
paradigms between, as Peterson explains it: 
1. Advanced nanotechnology: focussed on Feynman’s original vision of broad 
control at the level of individual atoms, utilising nanomachines; and 
2. Near-term nanotechnology: focussed on an expanded NNI vision that includes 
anything smaller than microtechnology [22].  
Yet, despite the meaning of the word ‘nanotechnology’ shifting away from 
Feynman’s vision [23], the current discussion of near-term nanotechnology is 
“conducted in the parameters set by the initial utopian and dystopian extremes” [24]. In 
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this light, high-level reports, such as the 2002 National Science Foundation’s 
Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance, have been criticised for 
failing to distinguish between “…science and science fiction, hype and reality” [25]. 
 
According to some, the ambiguity and flexibility of understandings is intentional 
[23, 26]. Drexler believes that the framing of contemporary nanotechnology is 
institutionally influenced, with some researchers defining ‘nanotechnology’ in a way 
that suits the ‘funding coalition’ [23]. Drexler explains that this generally results in 
definitions that include any technology with nanoscale features, thereby allowing 
“specialists from diverse fields to infuse unrelated research with the Feynman 
mystique” [23]. Selin agrees, arguing that the constructs of the nanotechnology debate 
in the North have been created with a false sense of certainty by those seeking to gain 
the most: 
The story of the rhetorical development of nanotechnology reveals how 
speculative claims are powerful constructions that create legitimacy in this 
emerging technological domain [26].  
In the meantime, the debate about Southern engagement with nanotechnology has 
forged ahead, assuming common understandings about what nanotechnology is and 
what it is not, as well as the general irrelevance of definitional debates. This is 
potentially problematic, given the conflicting way that nanotechnology is framed in the 
literature relating to the technology’s impact on, and in, the South. At different times, 
Southern nanotechnology debates have consciously drawn on understandings that 
correlate with both ‘near-term’ and ‘advanced’ nanotechnology. Whilst most writing 
presents near-term nanotechnology as the mainstream, there are instances where 
advanced nanotechnology has also been presented as ‘the reality’ for the South. Bruns, 
for example, sees answers for global poverty through a future of accessible abundance 
based on the application of advanced nanotechnology [27]. Al'Afghani, on the other 
hand, focuses on the need for future environmental laws in the South to incorporate 
“mechanisms for licensing, supervision and control of emissions and disposal methods 
for both MNT [molecular nanotechnology] products and nanofactories” [28]. 
Furthermore, a 2003 briefing document for a United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation Expert Group Meeting, predominantly attended by representatives from 
the Global South, refers to the ability for advanced nanotechnology to address medical, 
energy and environmental challenges via “…factories operating at the nanometer level, 
including nanoscale conveyor belts and robotic arms bringing molecular parts together 
precisely…” [29].  
Perhaps a greater disservice to clarity comes from those in the North who draw on 
the hype of advanced nanotechnology’s terminology and imagery when describing the 
benefits of near-term nanotechnology, without distinguishing between the two 
paradigms. One common way is by talking about recent innovation in areas of social 
development whilst referring to nanotechnology as a manufacturing revolution that will 
result in material abundance [see, for example, 2, 30, 31, 32]. The Association for 
Women’s Rights in Development, for example, highlight nanotechnology’s current 
consumer benefits, talk about near-term developments for water purification, cheap 
energy, and accessible medical treatments, but also interweave, with distinct certainty, 
information about the long-term benefits of ‘nanobots’, whilst envisaging a world 
where “many of the material dreams of humanity can be fulfilled”  [32]. 
If greater clarity is to be forthcoming, debates about nanotechnology’s Southern 
impacts must include Southern perspectives. Few have recognised or explored how 
nanotechnology is defined, perceived or framed in relation to the South and by people 
from the South. Given the importance of clarity for shaping domestic ELSI and 
international regulatory debates, in this chapter I seek to provide an introductory study 
of these matters. 
1. Methods 
This chapter reports on a 2004 qualitative study undertaken in Thailand and Australia. 
A group of key informantsiii, sixteen from Thailand and fifteen from Australia, were 
interviewed about their understandings and perspectives relating to nanotechnology, as 
part of a wider study on nanotechnology and the South.  
Whilst the study sought exploratory, rather than representative, perspectives on 
how nanotechnology might be understood in the Southiv, a key informant process was 
used to ensure a range of perspectives were considered [34]. Given the argument that 
studies assessing nanotechnology’s impacts relating to the South must go beyond 
consultations based purely on scientific perspectives [7], this study included 
interviewees with expertise in ethics, law, social science, science policy and 
development studies. Effort was made to ensure the involvement of people with 
experience across the ‘development process’, from grassroots activism through to 
government policymaking and industry leadership, with interviewees coming from 
academia, as well as private, government and non-government (NGO) sectors.  
Nineteen of the key informants, slightly more than a half of my sample, were engaged 
in work that involved nanotechnology. All key informants from Thailand were Thai 
citizens. Key informants were identified through web and literature searches as well as 
a simplified process of co-nomination [35]. 
Linguistic, financial and temporal limitations, as well as nanotechnology’s nascent 
stage at the time of the study, restricted the ability for wider public engagement, 
particularly outside of Bangkok, Thailand. Despite every effort to ensure diversity, the 
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 Each key informant’s responses in this research are views held by themselves and do not necessarily 
represent those of the organizations with whom it is noted that they were affiliated. Where mentioned, each 
key informant’s title and affiliation has been used to add credibility to their statements and allow for cross-
sectoral analysis. Stated titles and affiliations are those held at the time of each interview. 
majority of Thai key informants spoke fluent English and had, at some stage, received 
educational training abroad. The results of this study must be interpreted with these 
limitations in mind. 
A study of a small number of key informants in Thailand can in no way be seen as 
indicative of attitudes across the non-homogenous South, particularly given Thailand’s 
lack of a colonial history. However, Thai perspectives can be useful for exploring and 
considering nanotechnology and the South, given the situation Thailand faces in terms 
of both development and nanotechnology.  
Thailand is classified by the United Nations Development Program as a “middle 
income country” [36] and is ranked 74th out of 175 countries on the Human 
Development Indexv [37]. In recent decades it has experienced remarkable progress in 
human development [36]. However, Thailand’s greater population continues to face 
significant challenges. As of 2004, 21 per cent of the Thai population earned less than 
$2 a day [38], whilst financial inequality had increased over the past 40 years, 
particularly between urban and rural areas [39]. Stark inequities are also evident in the 
distributed burden of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and general access to health services 
[36].  Various populations still suffer from very high levels of child malnutrition and 
maternal mortality, whilst overuse of pesticides is a threat to many in rural areas [36]. 
Despite the fact that the vast majority of Thais live in rural locations, the country is 
experiencing rapid urbanisation as well as an ageing population [37]. 
In terms of its engagement with emerging technology, Thailand has supportive 
infrastructure and strong hopes for biotechnology R&D [40]. In an early study of 
Southern nanotechnology capabilities, Thailand was identified as a “middle ground” 
Southern country [41]. This analysis is supported by early evidence of nanotechnology 
R&D [42-46], including the establishment of a national centre [47] and development of 
a national nanotechnology strategy [48]. Just as Thailand faces significant challenges 
with biotechnology innovation [43], so too do people claim Thailand faces significant 
challenges for nanotechnology innovation [44, 49]. From the perspective of ELSI, 
Thailand has a history of controversy in biotechnology, ranging from issues of morality 
[50] and environmental concerns [51], through to issues of intellectual property such as  
‘biopiracy’ [52, 53] and compulsory licensing [54]. Yet already, the ELSI of Thai 
nanotechnology has created controversy around the issue of ‘atomically modified 
organisms’ [55]. 
Given the role of the North in shaping and driving debates about nanotechnology 
in the South, the value of simultaneously considering Northern perspectives must not 
be underestimated. Australian perspectives can act as a useful reference point given the 
country has been firmly entrenched in international nanotechnology debates having 
developed the world’s first ‘nanomachine’ in 1997 [56]. However, as of 2004, 
Australia also lacked a formal national nanotechnology initiative and its global output 
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was below expected levels [57]. Furthermore, Australia has also faced a slow uptake of 
engagement with ELSI debates in areas such as health and safety [58], and low levels 
of public understanding and knowledge about nanotechnology [59]. 
Considering the importance of the interviewee’s own framework of meanings, the 
31 interviews in both Australia and Thailand were semi-structured, which allows for a 
broad framing but individual divergence [60]. Each interview lasted between 20 and 80 
minutes, was face-to-face vi , and interviewees were offered professional translation 
services. All data was analysed using NVivo™ software, noted for its ability to assist in 
developing an emergent analysis [62]. 
3. Results 
In terms of how nanotechnology is understood, three areas of interest emerged, 
constituting the areas explored in this chapter. First were the characteristics seen as 
defining nanotechnology. Second was how nanotechnology is perceived, in terms of its 
scope, level of sophistication and complexity. Third was the framing paradigm seen as 
most relevant to Southern nanotechnology debates. 
anotechnology’s Common, Defining Characteristics 
Given the definition is “still evolving” [63] and “very broad” [64], some of the 
interviewees considered it difficult to define what nanotechnology ‘is’ [63, 64]. As a 
Thai policy officer from the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Centre for Technology 
Foresight (APECCTF) noted, presently the “…definition has some diversity that can 
change according to the context” [65]. Others agreed that there will always be diversity 
of opinion [66], no matter what certain authorities might specify or claim [67]. 
However, on the whole, interviewees from all sectors, in both Australia and 
Thailand, presented surprisingly similar responses as to the characteristics that 
contribute to nanotechnology’s definition. The following six characteristics were seen 
as fundamental: 
 
• Nanotechnology is based upon a size or length scale (the nanoscale); 
• Nanotechnology involves the ability to either ‘control’, ‘manipulate’ or 
‘engineer’ on the nanoscale; 
• Nanotechnology involves exploiting properties unique to the nanoscale; 
• Nanotechnology is the practical application resulting from this exploitation;  
• Nanotechnology is often the product of conducting ‘old science’ in a new way; 
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  Noted as an advantageous method in future-oriented research [61]. 
• Nanotechnology is the natural (but sometimes unconscious) progression for 
those working in cutting-edge areas of science and is, therefore, a new field 
rather than a new discipline. 
The most commonly defined feature of nanotechnology is that it relates to a 
length-scale (or size). Interviewees generally provided technical explanations, noting 
that there is a “loose definition of nanotechnology to be between 1 and 100 
nanometres…” [68], with a nanometre being equal to ‘10-9’ metres [69]. A Senior 
Researcher from the Thai National Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology 
(BIOTEC) highlighted other standard references such as the ‘nanoscale’ (the length-
scale generally accepted as 1-100 nanometres), and described this informally as “mid-
way between [the] atomic scale and the convention[al] scale that we are familiar 
with…[where one] would think of technology which deals with materials of a few 
atoms or a few molecules” [67]. Only the Director of the Australian International 
Health Institute, and the Australian Chief Executive Officer of The Fred Hollows 
Foundation provided non-scientific responses, referring to nanotechnology as 
“miniaturisation” [70] or “really tiny things” [71]. 
Nearly half the interviewees referred to nanotechnology in terms of its command 
over the small scale. An Investment Manager specialising in nanotechnology from 
Invest Australia described nanotechnology as “the control and ability to manipulate 
material at the atomic level” [68]. The Director of the National Nanotechnology Centre 
of Thailand (NANOTEC), talked in a similar manner of nanotechnology as “the control 
of microstructure[s] or manipulation of the atoms or molecules or the clusters of 
molecules” [72]. Both Australian and Thai interviewees commonly referred to this trait 
as ‘engineering’ on the nanoscale. 
A number of interviewees highlighted that nanotechnology exploits unique 
properties not exhibited in bulk materials [72, 73]. The ability to utilise these unique 
properties was seen as the basis for enhanced research possibilities [74]. 
For many, it was important to make the distinction between nanoscience and 
nanotechnology. Interviewees distinguished that nanotechnology was the “practical 
application” of nanoscience [75] “because it has got the word ‘technology’ in it” [63]. 
This suggests an important distinction, particularly in terms of discussing a countries’ 
role in nanotechnology research and design, because it means a countries’ ability to 
produce the technology must be considered in addition to its ability to conduct 
research. 
The ethicists and lawyers amongst the interviewees presented nanotechnology as 
“a new form of technology” [76-78]. However, the majority of interviewees, 
particularly those with backgrounds in science and chemistry, claimed that 
nanotechnology was using ‘old’ science in a ‘new way’, or what an Associate Professor 
of Microelectronics at the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT) referred to as “an old 
wine in a new bottle” [79]. In many instances, interviewees made the distinction 
between ‘nanoscience’ and ‘nanotechnology’, suggesting that nanotechnology builds 
on nanoscience knowledge that has “…been in existence for a long time…” [63], with 
the Senior Researcher from Thailand’s BIOTEC presenting the example of liposome 
drug delivery as a nanotechnology process that has “been going on for some time” [67]. 
An Australian Research Fellow from the Department of Chemical and Biomolecular 
Engineering at the University of Melbourne, explained his nanotechnology work in a 
similar manner: 
…using particles loaded with a drug for drug delivery is very well established 
and old technology… the particles will become more sophisticated and will 
become more complex, but it will be the continuous change I see there that 
builds up from the brilliant work which is already published [80]. 
An Associate Professor from the Petroleum and Petrochemical College at 
Chulalongkorn University (CU) made similar comments, noting that the contemporary 
term ‘nanotechnology’ can be used to classify previous work that occurred on the 
nanoscale: 
even [if] we do not have the ‘nano’ wording… the way that people learn from 
experience and come to the molecules and start from molecules and go back, 
is already the nano work… [75]. 
Interviewees highlighted a subsequent “re-branding of old technologies” [80] to fulfil 
an organizational objective. The Associate Professor from the Petroleum and 
Petrochemical College at CU explained a common experience for many Thai scientists 
where their ongoing research was, all of a sudden, re-termed ‘nanotechnology’ [75]. 
Others noted surprise at discovering they had unconsciously been working in 
nanotechnology. The first reactions of an Australian Medical Doctor, from the Royal 
Prince Alfred Hospital highlighted this point: 
When you talked about nanotechnology I thought ‘what on earth is that?’… 
and then you sort of brought it down to atoms and molecules, and then, of 
course, I realised that the antigen/antibody reactions which we have been 
dealing with for… lots of years, [are] at that scale [81]. 
This suggests that, for many, this transition may yet be unknown. 
The Associate Professor of Microelectronics at AIT saw the positives in these 
points, suggesting that “the attractive thing about nanotechnology is that everyone says 
‘hey, I am in it, I know it, I have been working on it but I have not been using that 
word’” [79]. 
Furthermore, interviewees described the shift to working in nanotechnology as a 
“logical migration” [82] for those at the forefront of various cutting-edge areas of 
science. As a Researcher from the Australian Academy of Science noted, “if people are 
working in physics, chemistry and biology they are going to be working in 
nanotechnology because [it is at] the cutting edge of these topics [83]. Interviewees 
suggested that this loose, and often unconscious, new grouping of research and its 
cross-fertilisation between both disciplines and sectors, means that nanotechnology is a 
new field, as distinct to a new discipline or industry. 
The sum of these findings suggests relatively common understandings in relation 
to nanotechnology’s distinguishing features and give credence to the comments of the 
Director of the Nanotechnology Centre with Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific 
Industrial Development Organisation that there is no problem in interpretation and no 
need to get “hung up on definitions” [84]. The commonality of understandings are 
made all the more surprising given 12 of the Australian and Thai interviewees had no 
background in nanotechnology, with some stating that their understandings were very 
limited [70, 76]. 
Differing Perceptions 
Having identified the characteristics that contribute to nanotechnology’s definition, in 
this section I look at how these factors translate into the way nanotechnology is 
perceived in terms of its scope, level of sophistication and complexity. 
Discussion of nanotechnology’s scope was often prefaced by reference to its trait 
of “…organising present knowledge in various areas; in chemistry… in biology, 
physics, engineering and so on” [82]. Hence, many interviewees spoke of 
nanotechnology’s wide-ranging nature. The Director of NANOTEC, for example, 
suggested that nanotechnology “…covers almost everything in all fields and at all 
levels” [72]. In this sense, interviewees highlighted the substitutability of the word 
‘nanotechnology’ with the, perhaps more appropriate, ‘nanotechnologies’.  
The Associate Director of the Institute for Nanoscale Technology from the 
University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) believed the wide-ranging nature of 
nanotechnology means the boundaries of where nanotechnology starts and begins are 
unclear [63], with the Director of NANOTEC noting that this can create a tension 
between having a definition that is “comprehensive” yet “unifying” [72].  
The wide-ranging nature of nanotechnology also means that there will be vastly 
different approaches to research undertaken by different groups. A Professor of 
Structural Engineering at AIT recognised the possibility of employing either a ‘top 
down’ or ‘bottom up’ approach to R&D in an area such as material science [66]. 
Given its wide-ranging nature, I was interested in understanding how 
nanotechnology is generally perceived in terms of its technical sophistication. The 
results showed that nanotechnology is commonly perceived as ‘high-tech’ [70, 75, 85], 
“cutting-edge” [76] or relying on “higher technologies” [67]. Interestingly, Thais saw 
nanotechnology as less ‘high-tech’ than their Australian counterparts. 
To some extent, the justification for responses came from associated assumptions 
based on the nature of the word ‘nanotechnology’. The Director of the Australian 
International Health Institute, who noted the limitations of his nanotechnology 
understanding, went on to state: “…it is all at the high-tech end” [70]. For most, 
however, nanotechnology’s ‘high-tech’ label was justified by the demands it creates in 
terms of the level of human or technical resources required [66]. The Director of 
NANOTEC, for example, spoke of the need for “well qualified technicians” [72] 
holding advanced knowledge to operate or maintain nanotechnology equipment. He 
also highlighted a view held by many Thai scientists when he stated that the equipment 
is quite specialised and precise and that looking at nanostructures requires very high 
resolution devices [72].  
Yet, others challenged the idea that nanotechnology relies on “…highly 
sophisticated instruments” [80], paving the way for a belief that, even if 
nanotechnology is perceived as high-tech, its scope includes a wide range of 
applications that vary with respect to the demands of required inputs. A number of 
Australian and Thai interviewees believed nanotechnology is not just high-tech [66] but 
spans low- through to high-tech [64, 72]. The Australian Executive Advisor to the 
APECCTF spoke of low-tech nanotechnology having “…existed for a long time in 
terms of micronised powders” [64] that the Thai policy officer from the APECCTF said 
can translate into everyday products such as self-cleaning powders or influence 
manufacturing aspects of textiles such as silk [65]. Even the Director of NANOTEC, 
who had previously presented nanotechnology as “high-tech”, spoke of its scope 
encompassing “very basic research”, such as putting nanoparticles into wine or 
developing water-repellent surfaces for garments [72]. Reinforcing that 
nanotechnology represents a spectrum of applications with varying input demands, the 
Executive Advisor to the APECCTF and the Director of NANOTEC both highlighted 
the example of ‘quantum dots’ at the high-tech end of nanotechnology’s spectrum that 
require sophisticated knowledge and intense technical infrastructure [64, 72]. 
Yet, a number of interviewees believed that nanotechnology is often inaccurately 
perceived as purely high-tech, a mistake they believed will be clarified with deeper 
understandings. The Executive Advisor to the APECCTF posited that people who have 
read about nanotechnology will see the “‘gee whiz’ stuff” but that “the people who 
know a bit about it may be a little bit more circumspect…” [64]. 
Focussing on ear-term anotechnology: The Rejection of Molecular 
Manufacturing 
As outlined previously, when it comes to literature linking nanotechnology and the 
South, commentaries have alluded to nanotechnology in two very different forms. Most 
commonly, nanotechnology is presented as an emerging field focused on applications 
arising from everyday science that exploits phenomena unique to the nanoscale. Less 
commonly, nanotechnology is presented as highly futuristic applications resulting from 
an ability to manufacture atomic self-replication, also known as molecular 
manufacturing. Considering the scientific controversy surrounding the latter proposal, 
in this section I look at interviewee perspectives on futuristic applications and 
molecular manufacturing. 
For some Australian interviewees there was a belief that governments in the 
Global South might engage with nanotechnology under the pre-tense of its potential for 
applications of a ‘highly futuristic’ nature, i.e. applications arising from scientific 
breakthroughs that are yet to occur or that some challenge in terms of their possibility. 
The Associate Director of the Institute for Nanoscale Technology from UTS, for 
example, was worried that Southern images of nanotechnology might include “nano-
bots” ahead of examples such as “energy efficient coatings for windows and paints” 
[63]. Some interviewees who saw these ideas driven by the media, thought the hype 
might be even more exaggerated in the South [64, 80]. In addition to futuristic claims, 
it was also believed this hype, as witness in the North, could lead to a polarisation 
within Southern discussions. An Australian Professor from the Centre for Applied 
Philosophy and Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University (CSU) presented this 
polarisation as similar to the phenomena witnessed with the emergence of Artificial 
Intelligence in the 1970s and 1980s where groups of people thought it would “save the 
world” and others thought “…it was one of the worst things that could happen…” [69]. 
The latter perspectives were seen as incorporating ‘doom and gloom’ scenarios relating 
to molecular manufacturing and uncontrolled atomic self-replication that would result 
in the ‘grey goo’ phenomenon. 
In this respect, discussion of futuristic applications do play some part in the Thai 
public discourse on nanotechnology, as witnessed by the example from the Senior 
Researcher from Thailand’s BIOTEC of his speaking about the film ‘Fantastic 
Voyage’
vii
 to students at Sirinthorn International Institute. Interviewees also 
acknowledged that a discourse around futuristic threats exists, with the Thai Prime 
Minister’s Science and Technology Advisor saying that “people are talking about the 
‘grey goo’” [86]. 
However, although a common belief was held that the bulk of nanotechnology’s 
applications were some way off in terms of Thai actualisation [87, 88], ‘futuristic’ 
applications were never central to interviewee responses about nanotechnology. 
Furthermore, descriptions about nanotechnology and its applications never implied an 
understanding of nanotechnology as molecular manufacturing. On the contrary, for the 
few times when molecular manufacturing was raised in conversation, interviewees 
spoke extremely cynically of its feasibility, particularly in the coming 20 years [79]. 
The Thai policy officer from the APECCTF claimed this cynicism is supported by most 
Thai scientists who dismiss the “…realisation of so-called ‘self-replicat[ion]’” [65]. 
Moreover, there was a general absence of the Northern ‘doom’ polemic, with most 
scientists dismissive of “the future threats” from potential self-replication [65]. In this 
light, it would appear that the case of Thailand presents a different picture to the 
generally polarised views appearing via popular science media in the North. As a 
speculative explanation, the Professor from the Centre for Applied Philosophy and 
Public Ethics at CSU suggested that this could demonstrate cultural differences 
between the North and South: 
It might be sort of a cultural thing, too. The ‘grey goo’ is sort of a nice image 
that… our media can do a lot with… Maybe it will not [be the same coverage] 
in some other countries, particularly… if they think that there are enormous 
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benefits from other aspects of it [69]. 
In this respect, the Senior Researcher from Thailand’s BIOTEC added that 
pressing issues such as bird flu mean that new technologies are presented in terms of 
their ameliorating capabilities rather than the potentially dire future consequences [67]. 
However, the Thai Prime Minister’s Science and Technology Advisor felt that, 
given the rapid, global nature of information dissemination in the 21st century, a 
uniform understanding about nanotechnology’s overarching paradigm is not 
guaranteed, and that hype and concerns relating to molecular manufacturing could 
capture the Thai public’s mind and change the kind of nanotechnology being discussed 
[86]. Yet, the Thai policy officer from the APECCTF only saw this happening if 
Northern debates further infiltrated Southern settings, saying a shift in public debate 
could be prompted if more common reference was made to articles appearing in foreign 
papers such as the ew York Times [65]. 
4. Conclusions 
Although this research has only investigated the perspectives of a limited number of 
key informants from Australia and Thailand, the clear identification of six common 
characteristics, in terms of how nanotechnology is defined, raises the possibility that 
interactions between the South and North can be based upon shared foundations. These 
characteristics include nanotechnology’s length-scale, its focus on the control of 
matter; its exploitation of novel scale-based phenomena, its practical nature, its 
rebranding and integration of existing practices and its subsequent, natural emergence 
across a number of sectors, resulting in a new field, rather than a new discipline or 
industry. 
However, how nanotechnology is understood goes beyond its defining 
characteristics, as there appears large difference in nanotechnology’s perceived scope, 
sophistication and complexity. Yet, when comparing Thai and Australian interviewee 
perspectives, it becomes readily apparent that the distinctions in perception are less 
between countries than between interviewees with expertise in differing fields. This is 
particularly true in terms of nanotechnology’s claimed novelty, its range of applications 
and its complexity, and may be explained by an individual’s level of nanotechnology 
awareness or their motivation to present nanotechnology in a way that reinforces their 
own perspectives. 
Overarching these debates is the paradigmatic framework encompassing 
nanotechnology. Contrary to popular belief amongst Australian interviewees, 
nanotechnology in Thailand is framed in terms of its near-term capabilities rather than 
those attributed to the speculative paradigm of molecular manufacturing. Whilst one 
interviewee suggested this as a phenomenon grounded in cultural  difference, the 
responses from Thai interviewees, as well as previous research (Maclurcan 2005), 
suggest that the market guides the framing of nanotechnology in the South, thereby 
dictating a focus on the kind of nanotechnology that presents foreseeable returns. 
Combined, the findings in this chapter suggest both common ground and critical 
differences in terms of how nanotechnology can be understood. If the way 
nanotechnology is understood directly affects the framing of discussions about its 
ethical, legal and social implications, then the international community has both 
opportunities and challenges to face in order to ensure meaningful discussions ensue. 
For example, if nanotechnology’s complexity is presented in diametrically opposed 
ways, is it ever worthwhile to compare arguments relating to the expected costs and 
infrastructure required for a developing country to conduct nanotechnology R&D? Or, 
if the scope of nanotechnology’s application is not clearly defined, how can the 
international community best respond to issues of risk, law, trade and governance? 
Whilst the mainstream absence in Thailand of the ‘doom scenarios’ that have 
plagued Northern nanotechnology debates could result in a more streamlined narrative, 
the international history of debates about genetic modification suggest that wide 
differences in public perception about nanotechnology could result in a milieu ripe for 
polarised discussions. 
In light of increasing public unrest at nanotechnology’s rapid development, and 
upon the geo-political backdrop of the genetically-modified foods debate, the need for 
meaningful, participatory engagement would appear obvious. To achieve this, both 
within the South and internationally, will require greater attention to the way in which 
nanotechnology is perceived, as part of a more holistic consideration for how 
nanotechnology is understood. 
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